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LEGAL HISTORY IN THE IDGH COURT-
0 HABEAS CORPUS 
Dallin H. Oaks* 
EVER since Chief Justice Marshall declared that courts could resort to the common law to determine what Congress meant by the 
term "habeas corpus" in a federal statute,1 the history of this vener-
able remedy has played an important role in the Supreme Court. 
Over the years, however, courts have moved away from using the writ 
of habeas corpus for its historic functions of eliciting the cause of 
commitment and compelling adherence to prescribed procedures in 
advance of trial2 until today it has become primarily a means by 
which one court of general jurisdiction exercises post-conviction 
review over the judgment of another court of like authority.3 Despite 
this significant change in function, the United States Supreme Court 
has continued to support its decisions on questions of post-conviction 
review by calling upon the history of habeas corpus during that 
period when it was predominantly a pretrial remedy. Whatever view 
one may adopt as to the wisdom of these decisions, the results of 
the Court's "magisterial historiography" have not been happy for 
history.4 Three decisions of the October Term, 1962, provide prime 
examples. 
• Professor of Law, The University of Chicago.-Ed. 
I. See Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 93-94 (1807). 
2. See generally CHURCH, THE WRIT OF HABEAS CoRPus 2-30 (1884); 9 HOLDSWORTH, 
A HISTORY OF ENGUSH LAW 104 (1926); WALKER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL 
DEVELOPMENT OF HABEAS CORPUS AS THE WRIT OF LIBERTY (1960); Cohen, Habeas 
Corpus Cum Causa-The Emergence of the Modem Writ, IS CAN. B. REv. 10, 172 
(1940); Collings, Habeas Corpus for Convicts-Constitutional Right or Legislative 
Grace?, 40 CAUF. L. REv. 335, 341-61 (1952); Oaks, Habeas Corpus in the States-
1776-1865, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 243, 244-45 (1965). 
3. See, e.g., Pollak, Proposals To Curtail Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners 
-Collateral Attack on the Great Writ, 66 YALE L.J. 50 (1956); Reitz, Federal Habeas 
Corpus-Postconviction Remedy for State Prisoners, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 461 (1960); 
Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1956); Applica-
tion for Writs of Habeas Corpus and Post Conviction Review of Sentences in United 
States Courts, 33 F.R.D. 363 (1964). 
4. The quotation is from MAYERS, SHALL WE AMEND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 313 
n.l (1959). 
Several recent articles have criticized the Supreme Court's use of legal history. The 
most comprehensive of these is Kelly, CLIO and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1964 
SuP. CT. REv. 119, 131, which concludes that in the reapportionment, school segregation, 
church and state, sit-in, and birth control cases the Supreme Court was supporting its 
"libertarian interventionism in the social order" by a "historical technique of adjudica-
tion" that "may well be the successor to the sociologically oriented opinion of sub-
stantive due process days." The Supreme Court's historical representations in Fay v. 
Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), concerning the legislative history of the Habeas Corpus Act 
of 1867 are ably criticized in Mayers, The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867-The Supreme 
[451] 
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I. HABEAS CORPUS To INCLUDE DE Novo DETERMINATION OF FACTS 
In Townsend v. Sain5 a state prisoner souiht a writ of habeas 
corpus to obtain a federal hearing on a constitutional question that 
had already been heard by a state court. Prior decisions had estab-
lished that federal district courts had the power, on a habeas corpus 
petition, to hear testimony on a subject already considered by a state 
court.6 Therefore, the principal issue in Townsend was not the court's 
power, but rather the court's obligation: Could the district court dis-
pose of the petition by simply reviewing the ·written record from the 
state court, or did the federal Habeas Corpus Act7 (first enacted in 
1867) require an evidentiary hearing to "try issues of fact anew"?8 
- The historical development of habeas corpus was relevant to this 
inquiry because when the 1867 Congress provided that persons 
restrained of their liberty in violation of the Constitution could 
obtain a writ of habeas corpus from a federal court, it undoubtedly 
intended-except to the extent the legislation provided otherwise-
to incorporate the common-law uses and functions of this remedy. 
After the usual bow to history, the Supreme Court clarified the ex-
tent of the federal courts' authority to hold habeas corpus hearings 
by declaring that the district courts have power "to take testimony 
and determine the facts de novo in the largest terms"0 and that "the 
power of inquiry on federal habeas corpus is plenary."10 On the sub-
ject of the courts' obligation, the Supreme Court listed various cir-
cumstances in which it held that a federal court "must grant an 
evidentiary hearing to a habeas corpus applicant"¼1 detained under 
the judgment of a state court. 
A. Common-Law Rules Against De Novo Hearing 
Responsible students of the problem presented in Townsend 
differ over the wisdom, in a federal system, of requiring-or even 
Court as Legal Historian, 33 U. Cm. L. REv. 31 (1965). Another example of Supreme 
Court historiography is discussed in Tefft, United States v. Barnett: "'Twas a Famous 
Victory," 1964 SUP. CT. REv. 123, 132-33. 
5. 372 U.S. 293 (1963). 
6. See, e.g., Rogers v. Richmond, 357 U.S. ~20 (1958); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 
(1953); Cranor v. Gonzales, 226 F.2d 83 (9th Cir. 1955). See generally Bailey, Federal 
Habeas Corpus, 45 B.U.L. R.Ev. 161, 167, 169-71, 176-77 (1965). 
7. 62 Stat. 964 (1948), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1964). As far as state prisoners 
are concerned, this provision traces its history to Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 27, 14 Stat, 
385. 
8. 372 U.S. at 309. 
9. Id. at 311. 
10. Id. at 312. 
11. Id. at 313. The Court listed six situations in which an evidentiary hearing 
is required. Ibid. 
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permitting-a federal court to hold a trial de novo on factual issues 
already resolved in _the state courts.12 Whatever the merit of the 
Court's holding, however, it clearly was not supported by the sup-
posed "common-law understanding"13 that the Court relied on to 
support its conclusion. Authorities on the history and use of habeas 
corpus14 mention no "common-law understanding" that a court 
hearing a habeas corpus petition could "determine the facts de novo 
in the largest terms."15 Moreover, the Court's holding plainly con-
tradicts a well-known, although out-dated, rule governing the 
procedure in habeas corpus. At common law a petitioner was not 
permitted to introduce evidence to controvert the truth of a return 
filed in response to a writ of habeas corpus.16 Thus, if the return 
stated a valid explanation for the confinement-such as the judg-
ment and sentence of a court-the petitioner would remain in 
custody. A court hearing a habeas corpus petition obviously would 
have no occasion to "determine the facts de novo" so long as the 
rule against controverting the jailer's return precluded the prisoner 
from challenging the findings or judgment of the committing court. 
The Townsend opinion contains no historical discussion to sup-
port its assertion about de novo hearings.17 For this purpose, the 
Court relied exclusively on the extensive discussion in Fay v. Noia,18 
which was decided the same day as the Townsend case. In a footnote 
to the Fay opinion, the Court stated: 
In making provision for the trial of fact on habeas (something 
that had been left unmentioned in the previous statutes govern-
ing federal habeas corpus), the Act of 1867 seems to have 
restored rather than extended the common-law powers of the 
habeas judge. For it appears that the common-law doctrine of 
the incontrovertibility of the truth of the return was subject 
to numerous exceptions.19 
12. Compare Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for 
State Prisoners, 76 HARv. L. REv. 441 (1963), with Reitz, supra note 3. See generally 
Note, 76 HARv. L. REv. 1253 (1963); 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 765 (1959); 68 YALE L.J. 98 (1958). 
13. 372 U.S. at 311. 
14. See, e.g., CHURCH, op. cit. supra note 2, §§ 221-55, 362-85; Chafee, The Most 
Important Human Right in the Constitution, 32 B.U.L. REv. 143 (1952); 1 Hor.nswo&ra, 
op. cit. supra note 2, at 227; Fox, Process of Imprisonment at Common Law, 39 L.Q. 
REv. 46 (1923); Jenks, The Story of the Habeas Corpus, 18 L.Q. REv. 64 (1902), re• 
printed in 2 SELEcr EssAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 531 (1908). 
15. 372 U.S. at 311. 
16. Commonwealth v. Chandler, 11 Mass. 83 (1814); People ex rel. Ordronaux v. 
Chegaray, 18 Wend. 637 (N.Y. 1836); CHURCH, op. cit. supra note 2, §§ 166-67; HURD, 
HABEAS CoRPus 263-77 (1858). See authorities quoted in note 20 infra. 
17. 372 U.S. at 311. 
18. 372 U.S. 391 (1963). The decision is discussed more fully in Part II infra. 
19. Id. at 416 n.27. 
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Only nvo authorities were cited to support the assertion that there 
were numerous exceptions to the doctrine of incontrovertibility, and 
both make it clear that the exceptions related almost exclusively to 
non-criminal commitments.20 With respect to commitments of per-
sons accused of crime, both authorities are flatly opposed to Mr. 
Justice Brennan's suggestion that a court hearing a habeas corpus 
· case has a common-law power to re-try factual questions already 
settled in courts of proper jurisdiction. Similarly, the important 
1816 English statute21-soon duplicated in most American sta.tes22-
which modified the harsh rule against controverting a return, was 
expressly inapplicable to persons "confined or restrained for some 
criminal or supposed criminal matter .... "28 
There is also ample authority to demonstrate that as late as the 
mid-nineteenth century an English prisoner was still forbidden to 
controvert the truth of a return given in response to his petition for 
habeas corpus. For example, in 1855 a prisoner convicted of a mis-
demeanor petitioned the Court of Common Pleas for habeas corpus 
relief, on the ground that the alleged offense was committed outside 
the territorial jurisdiction of the inferior court that had convicted 
20. Discussing commitments for criminal or supposed criminal matters, HURD, 
THE WRIT OF HABEAS CoRPus 270-71 (2d ed. 1876), states that the return "could not 
either at common law or under the habeas corpus act, 31 Car. II., be controverted 
with a view to the absolute discharge of the prisoner." There were "occasional 
exceptions," Hurd states (while listing only the subject of bail), "but they rest 
upon no well defined principle" and are "impossible to specify." Ibid. With respect 
to imprisonments other than for criminal matters, however, the exceptions to the 
rule against controverting the return were "governed by a principle sufficiently 
comprehensive to include most •.• cases" so that it was "impossible to specify those 
[non-criminal cases] in which it could not [b.e controverted]." Id. at 271. The other 
authority, 4 BACON, .ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAw 587 (Bouvier ed. 1844), states that "no 
one can in any case controvert the truth of the return to a habeas corpus." The only 
exceptions cited by Bacon relate to proceedings to determine whether a prisoner 
who had been indicted should be admitted to bail, and to a case where a petitioner 
was allowed to put in an issue of privilege in opposition to the return by way of 
confession and avoidance. Id. at 587-88. INGERSOLL, THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 15-19 
(1849), also cited by the Supreme Court but for a different proposition, lists one 
other exception: persons allegedly being illegally pressed into overseas military 
sei;vice. 
21. 56 Geo. 3, c. 100 (1816). 
22. See, e.g., Md. Laws 1813, pp. 624-25; N.Y. Laws 1818, p. 298. For a thorough 
discussion of the American legislation, see HURD, op. cit. supra note 20, at 277-88. 
This remedial legislation was probably meant to provide a means of contradicting 
the return of one who held a prisoner without legal process and had a personal 
interest in the question of his custody. Where the confinement was based on official 
process, these statutes gave "no greater right to inquire into the merits on which 
the process of commitment is founded, than was allowed by the common law." Bennac 
v. People, 4 Barb. 31, 34 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1848). 
23. 56.Geo. 3, c. 100, § I (1816). See Ex parte Beechings, 4 B. &: C. 136, 107 Eng, Rep, 
1010 (K.B. 1825). 
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h~. He offered affidavits in support of his assertions.24 Although 
the Courts of Westminster clearly had authority to release prisoners 
wrongfully detained by inferior courts,25 this petition was unani-
mously rejected with the observation that the petitioner's argument 
was "as groundless as it is unprecedented."26 The opinion of Chief 
Justice Jervis observed: 
[T]he finding of the jury is, that the· prisoner committed the 
offense within the jurisdiction of the court, as alleged. He now 
seeks to impeach that finding, on the ground that the place 
where the offense was actually committed is more than one 
thousand yards distant from the boundary of the parish in which 
the record alleges it to have been committed. That is not to be 
governed by the inquiry whether the fact be indisputable or 
othenvise. If we could entertain the application because the 
boundary is clearly ascertained, we should be equally bound to 
entertain disputes of the most refined and minute character. 
The inconvenience of this is manifest. The truth is that the 
remedy is not by an application of this sort.27 
Just a few years earlier, the Justices of Queen's Bench had re-
fused relief on a similar ground in two noteworthy cases. In the first, 
Carus Wilson's Case,28 the jailer's return stated that the petitioner 
was held under a legally valid sentence of the Royal Court at Jersey. 
For this reason, the court held that the petitioner could not intro-
duce affidavits to show that the lower court had acted inconsistently 
with Jersey law.29 Two years later this same ground was employed to 
24. In the Matter of Newton, 16 C.B. 97, 139 Eng. Rep. 692 (C.P. 1855). 
25. See authorities cited in Collings, supra note 2, at 338 n.14. 
26. 16 C.B. at 102, 139 Eng. Rep. at 694. 
27. Id. at 101-02, 139 Eng. Rep. at 694. A similar view was expressed in the opinion 
of Justice Williams: "If an application of this sort could be entertained, it would be 
open to a party, after a lengthened inquiry at the assizes as to whether or not the 
alleged offence was committed within the county, to cause himself to be brought up 
by habeas corpus, and have the whole matter tried over again upon affidavits. So 
monstrous a state of things never could be." Id. at 103, 139 Eng. Rep. at 694. 
28. 7 Q.B. 984, 115· Eng. Rep. 759 (1845). 
29. "[W]e may decide the question before us by considering the principle of the 
exception that runs through the whole law of habeas corpus, whether under common 
law or statute, namely, that our form of writ does not apply where a party is in 
execution under the judgment of a competent Court. If, indeed, it were proposed 
to shew that the prisoner had never been before such Court at all, or that no such 
sentence had been in fact given, there might be a difficulty in saying that a traverse 
to that effect could not be allowed. But, when it appears that the party has been 
before a Court of competent jurisdiction, which Court has committed him for a con-
tempt or any other cause, I think it is no longer open to this Court to enter at all 
into the subject matter. If we were to do so, we should constitute ourselves a Court 
of Error from such other Court; and should be constantly examining whether the 
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deny habeas corpus relief to a petitioner who sought to have the court 
review by affidavit whether the Royal Court of Jersey, which had 
convicted him of burglary, had authority to sentence him to be 
transported.80 
In view of the foregoing authority, it is not surprising that neither 
Townsend nor Fay refers to any case illustrating the so-called "com-
mon-law understanding" by which a court presented with the record 
of a hearing in another court of general jurisdiction was supposed to 
have held an· evidentiary hearing to develop the facts de novo. 
B. Limited Use of De Novo Hearings 
There are two early lines of authority on subjects somewhat 
related to the issues considered in Townsend and Fay that the Su-
preme Court might have used to support its assertion of a "common-
law understanding," but both are of limited applicability and con-
cern a usage of habeas corpus now practically outmoded. A recent 
English article refers to several nineteenth century cases in which 
courts accepted extrinsic evidence to controvert a return to a writ 
of habeas corpus, but those cases involved commitments by courts 
of inferior jurisdiction, over whom the scope of review by habeas 
circumstances, the existence of which was proved, warranted the opinion which such 
Court had formed." Id. at 1008, 115 Eng. Rep. at 769; accord, Case of the Sheriff of 
Middlesex, 11 Ad. & E. 273, 292, 113 Eng. Rep. 419, 426 (Q.B. 1840). Of course, habeas 
corpus would lie if the order of commitment were illegal on its face, Sec, e.g., The 
King v. James, 5 B. &: Ald. 894, 106 Eng. Rep. 1418 (K.B. 1822); Rex v. Collyer, Say. 
44, 96 Eng. Rep. 797 (K.B. 1752). See also Queen v. Batcheldor, 1 Per. &: Dav. 516, 
537 (1839), where Chief Justice Denman suggested, by way of dictum, that a petitioner 
for habeas corpus might be afforded an opportunity to introduce evidence to contro• 
vert the return "if the falsehood of the returns were made in any degree probable 
before us ••• .'' However, just three years later this same court, with Chief Justice 
Denman presiding, held that where a return to a writ of habeas corpus included a 
copy of an order which stated that the petitioner had been brought to the bar of 
the Court of Chancery and committed for contempt, the petitioner would not be 
permitted to controvert this return by affidavits to show that he had never been 
brought to the bar of the court at all. Ex parte Clarke, 2 Q.B. 619, 114 Eng. Rep. 
243 (1842). 
30. Brenan's Case, 10 Q.B. 492, 116 Eng. Rep. 188 (1847). "No objection was made 
to the return on the ground that it did not shew jurisdiction in the Court to try 
and punish for the crime of burglary: but it was said to be bad for not shewing 
that the Court had power to punish by transportation. 
"We think, however, that, the Court having competent jurisdiction to try and 
punish the offence, and the sentence being unreversed, we cannot assume that it is 
invalid or not warranted by law, or require the authority of the Court to pass the 
sentence to be set out by the gaoler upon the return. ·we are bound to assume, prima 
facie, that the unreversed sentence of a Court of competent jurisdiction is correct; 
otherwise we should, in effect, be constituting ourselves a Court of appeal without 
power to reverse the judgment.'' Id. at 502, 116 Eng. Rep. at 192, 
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corpus has always been wider than in the case of superior courts.31 
Similarly, when a prisoner applied for habeas corpus before indict-
ment or trial, some courts examined the written depositions on 
which he had been arrested or committed, 32 and others even heard 
oral testimony88 to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to 
justify holding him for trial. This procedure amounted to a trial de 
novo on the limited issue of probable cause to detain the petitioner 
for trial. As noted in an extremely instructive opinion by a Virginia 
trial judge, however, the reason a habeas corpus court can look 
behind the warrant of a committing magistrate and consider or hear 
the evidence on which it is founded is that the magistrate is not a court 
of record whose decisions are subject to review by appeal or writ of 
error.34 Consequently, neither of the foregoing types of cases is 
authority for a trial de novo upon habeas corpus review of the final 
judgments of courts of general jurisdiction. 
The purpose of the foregoing discussion is not to argue that the 
Supreme Court reached the wrong decision in Townsend. Its conclu-
sion that a federal district court, when disposing of a habeas corpus 
application, has the power and sometimes the duty to hold a trial de 
novo on factual questions already' determined in a state court may 
be a sound decision for our time. The limited point urged here is 
that when the Court asserted that the 1867 act restored rather than 
extended the common-law powers of the habeas judge, 35 its assertion 
was plainly at variance with the facts of history. 
When the writ of habeas corpus performed its ancient function 
of eliciting the cause of imprisonment, or of enforcing the right to 
31. Rubinstein, Habeas Corpus as a Means of Review, 27 MoD. L. REv. 322, 326-32 
(1964). That this same distinction was observed in American courts is apparent from 
CHURCH, op. cit. supra note 2, §§ 235, 238. 
32. See, e.g., The King v. Marks, 3 East 157, 102 Eng. Rep. 557 (K.B. 1802) (peti-
tioners remanded because corpus delicti appeared in depositions though not in 
warrant of commitment); Lord Mohun's Case, 1 Salle. 104, 91 Eng. Rep.· 96 (1697) 
(court bails prisoner on basis of depositions given at coroner's inquest); Rex v. Dalton, 
2 Str. 911, 93 Eng. Rep. 936 (K.B. 1731). But cf. Rex v. Acton, 2 Str. 851, 93 Eng. Rep. 
893 (K.B. 1729); Rex v. Greenwood, 2 Str. 1138, 93 Eng. Rep. 1086 (K.B. 1739) (court 
· refuses to consider written evidence other than depositions in determining whether 
to admit petitioners to bail). 
In the leading American habeas corpus decision, Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 
Cranch) 75 (1807), the Supreme Court considered the evidence in the written 
depositions, concluded that no crime bad been committed, and entered an order 
discharging the petitioners. See also Ex parte Burford, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 448 (1806). 
For a discussion of state-court opinions illustrating this use of the writ, see Oaks, 
supra note 2, at 258-59. 
33. See United States v. Johns, 4 Dall. 412, 413 (U.S. Cir. Ct. 1806). 
34. Ex parte Pryor, 3 Quart. Law J. 371, 387-88 (Richmond, Va. Cir. Ct. 1858). 
35. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 416 n.27 (1963), relied on by the Court in Townsend 
v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 311 (1963). 
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bail or to release from confinement under void process prior to trial, 
there was seldom, if ever, any circumstance where a court of record 
had previously determined any factual issues that were relevant in 
the habeas corpus proceeding. The problem of de novo factual hear-
ing by habeas corpus is primarily incident to the use of habeas corpus 
as a post-convi~tion remedy-a relatively recent phenomenon. Con-
sequently, the Court would have been more forthright if it had 
recognized that ancient habeas corpus history was of little or no 
assistance in reaching a decision on an issue involving a relatively 
recent function of the writ, rather than claiming support from a 
supposed showing that its conclusion really was dictated by-or at 
least that it restored-the durable content of the ancient law. 
II. HABEAS CoRPus To R.Evmw ALL "INTOLERABLE RESTRAINTS" 
The second case from the 1962 Term, Fay v. Noia,86 also involved 
a state prisoner whose right to a writ of habeas corpus from a federal 
court turned on the construction of language in the Habeas Corpus 
Act. The issue was whether the provision requiring the exhaustion 
of state remedies87 barred relief to a petitioner whose coerced-confes-
sion claim, tendered and denied during the state-court trial,88 could 
not be reasserted in the state courts because he had failed to seek 
a direct appeal within the statutory time limit. This is another ques-
tion on which capable lawyers will differ. Its resolution should tum 
on a matter of legislative interpretation and-to the extent that the 
words of the act permit judicial innovation-on a consideration of 
the appropriate relationship between state and federal courts in our 
federal system. However, almost half of the Court's opinion is 
devoted to a far-ranging "preliminary inquiry into the historical 
development of the writ of habeas corpus,''80 which concludes with a 
well settled proposition that was not in issue and not mentioned in 
either brief:40 that habeas corpus is an appropriate remedy to chal-
lenge a conviction procured by a coerced confession. 
Although unnecessary and immaterial, the Court's historical exe-
gesis was not meaningless, since the Court used it to construct a 
conclusion or rule of great potential significance in future habeas 
36. 372 U.S. 391 (1963). 
37. 28 u.s.c. § 2254 (1964). 
38. For an account of the testimony heard by the jury in the trial of Noia and 
his co-defendants, see United States v. Murphy, 127 F. Supp. 689 (N.D.N.Y. 1955), 
39. 372 U.S. at 399. 
40. See Brief for Petitioner and Brief for Respondent, Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. !191 
(1963). 
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corpus litigation.41 According to Mr. Justice Brennan, "history refutes 
the notion that until recently the writ was available only in a very 
narrow class of lawless imprisonments."42 The true function of the 
·writ, he declared, "has been to provide a prompt and efficacious 
remedy for whatever society deems to be intolerable restraints. . . . 
Vindication of due process is precisely its historic office."43 Elsewhere 
he referred to "the common-law principle that restraints contrary to 
fundamental law, by whatever authority imposed, could be redressed 
by writ of habeas corpus"44 and to "the historic· office of the Great 
Writ to redress detentions in violation of fundamental law.''45 
Habeas corpus, it would seem, has always been a judicial thunderbolt 
for enforcing the dictates of natural law. 
A. Historical Development of the Writ 
Legal historians46-even those cited in the opinion47__:_hold a 
view that is at odds with the historical analysis in the Fay case. They 
emphasize that the writ originated as a mesne process by which courts 
compelled the attendance of parties whose presence would facilitate 
their proceedings. Even in the early part of the fifteenth century, 
habeas corpus was still being used as an ancillary writ in conjunction 
with ·writs of certiorari, privilege, and audita querela. The first 
recorded instance of habeas corpus being used as an independent 
remedy is toward the beginning of the sixteenth century. That 
century and the succeeding one saw a fierce struggle in which the 
courts of King's Bench and Common Pleas sought to establish their 
jurisdictional supremacy over the courts of Chancery and the Ex-
chequer, as well as special courts like the Privy Council, Admiralty, 
Requests, and High Commission. The writ of habeas corpus cum 
causa proved to be an extremely effective weapon in this struggle. 
According to Holdsworth, the common-law courts could use this writ 
41. A portion of the Court's historical discussion was material-that bearing on 
the meaning of the 1867 act, which authorized habeas corpus for federal prisoners. 
For a persuasive argument that the Court's conclusion-that Congress meant to 
authorize broad federal habeas corpus review of all state criminal convictions-is 
"inherently implausible" and "without historical foundation," see Mayers, supra note 4. 
42. 372 U.S. at 402-03. 
43. Id. at 401-02. 
44. Id. at 408. 
45. Id. at 412. 
46. See authorities cited supra notes 2 &: 14. 
47. The summary to follow above is taken principally from HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. 
supra note 2, WALKER, op. cit. supra note 2, INGERSOLL, op. cit. supra note 20, and Cohen, 
supra note 2. Each of these except Cohen was cited by Mr. Justice :Brennan, who seems 
to l,lave been notably unselective in his citation of authorities. E.g., 372 U.S. at 408 n.16, 
423 n.33. 
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to "bring before themselves and release persons who had been im-
prisoned by one of these rival courts, if, in their opinion, the court 
had acted in excess of its jurisdiction."48 
The writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, which was used in-
dependently to inquire into the cause of detention in both criminal 
and civil cases, was perfected during the seventeenth century. That 
its growth was gradual is apparent from a number of cases in the 
early 1600's in which persons imprisoned by the Crown or by the Privy 
Council were unable to secure release by habeas corpus even though 
the return to the ·writ stated no reason for their confinement.40 The 
availability of the ·writ as an effective remedy for executive detention 
not based on common-law process was not resolved, even in theory, 
until 1641. In that year an act of Parliament abolished the Star 
Chamber, eliminated or curtailed the jurisdiction of various councils, 
and authorized issuance of the writ of habeas corpus by King's 
Bench or Common Pleas for persons imprisoned by the command 
of the King, the Privy Council, the Council Board, or any successor 
to the jurisdiction of the Star Chamber.60 
The effect of certain exceptions in the 1641 act, considerable 
doubts about which courts or judicial officers had jurisdiction to 
issue the writ of habeas corpus, and various devices employed to 
avoid the effect of the ·writ, all united to permit continued infringe-
ments on the personal liberty of the subject51 and to necessitate the 
important reforms in the famous Habeas Corpus Act of 1679.li2 But 
that act, for all its renown, was essentially a reform of habeas corpus 
procedures· and jurisdictions. It merely clarified which courts or 
judicial officers could issue the writ, empowered judicial officers to 
issue it when courts were not in session, and established rules to 
govern the practice incident to the writ and to prevent its evasion.li8 
The act contained no enlargement of the types of confinements for 
which the writ could issue. In fact, it clearly exempted from the 
48. I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 2, at 227. 
49. See generally 6 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 2, at 31-40 (1924): WALKER, op, 
cit. supra note 2, at 57-74: Cohen, supra note 2, at 33-34, 38. 
50. 16 Car. 1, c. 10, § 8 (1641). Discussions of this act may be found in WALKER, op. 
cit. supra note 2, at 75-76; Cohen, supra note 2, at 172-74. 
51. See 9 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 2, at 115; WALKER, op. cit. supra note 
2, at 76-82. 
52. 31 Car. 2, c. 2 (1679). A discussion of this act appears in Cohen, supra note 2, 
at 183-96; Oaks, supra note 2, at 252-53. 
53. Ibid. See also DICEY, LAw oF THE CoNm'l1JTION 216-19 (9th ed. 1939), "Still 
this statute, although recognizing no new principle, put into more practical shape 
the remedy already well known, and marks an important period in the extending 
usefulness of the writ." INGERSOLL, op. cit. supra note 20, at 7. 
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benefits of the ·writ persons committed for "felony or treason plainly 
expressed in the warrant of commitment" and "persons convict or in 
execution by legal process."54 
The Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 apparently satisfied the need of 
that time, for the law in this area remained relatively static for the 
next century and- a half. The general rule, as stated by Lord Camp-
bell in an 1860 opinion denying habeas corpus relief to a person 
convicted of a criminal offense, was that 
a writ of habeas corpus, to the expediency of granting which 
we have also directed our attention, is not grantable in general 
where the party is in execution on a criminal charge, after 
judgment, on an indictment according to the course of common 
law.66 
B. Misinterpretation of Bushell's Case 
Mr. Justice Brennan did not discuss this gradual development in 
the uses of the writ of habeas corpus. In fact, he asserted that over 
the years "the nature and purpose of habeas corpus have remained 
remarkably constant,"66 a fitting and necessary foundation for his 
assertion that the "historic office" of this writ was to vindicate "due 
process" or "fundamental law" or to "provide a prompt and effica-
cious remedy for whatever society deems to be intolerable re-
straints. "67 To support this assertion, the Court offered three author-
ities: an ambiguous dictum in a famous 1670 contempt case in 
Common Ple<!-s,68 an obscure and unsupported statement in Bacon's 
Abridgment, 69 and a bill introduced in the House of Commons in 
1593 but never passed.60 
This triumvirate gives but fragile support for the Court's far-
reaching conclusion. The combination of authority is primarily 
noteworthy for the fact that this was apparently the best the Court 
54. 31 Car. 2, c. 2, § 3 (1679). 
55. Ex parte Lees, El., Bl. &: El. 828, 836, 120 Eng. Rep. 718, 721 (Q.B. 1860). See 
also cases discussed in text accompanying notes 24-30 supra. For a summary of the 
habeas corpus law of this period, see Collings, supra note 2, at 337-38. 
56. 372 U.S. at 402. 
57. Id. at 401-02. 
58. Bushell's Case, Vaughan 135, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670). See 372 U.S. at 
403-05. 
59. 4 BACON, op. cit. supra note 20, at 585-86. See 372 U.S. at 405. The Supreme 
Court once said of this same passage of Bacon's that "when applied to imprisonment 
under conviction and sentence, [it] is confined to cases of clear and manifest want of 
criminality in the matter charged, such as in effect to render the proceedings void." 
Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 376 (1879). 
60. Bill introduced in 1593 and quoted in WALKER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 44-45. 
See 372 U.S. at 402. 
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could assemble for an opinion whose text and voluminous footnotes 
bespeak prodigious research. 
The weight to be given to the short passage in Bacon's Abridg-
ment and to the abortive legislation is apparent without discussion. 
But the true significance of the Court's use of the landmark decision 
in Bushell's Case,61 which it offered as an example of the use of 
habeas corpus to relieve from an "intolerable" judicial restraint, 02 
requires some discussion. 
Bushell's Case involved a writ of habeas corpus issued by Com-
mon Pleas for a juror im.prisoned by the Court of Sessions for 
contempt after he and his eleven colleagues voted to acquit certain 
defendants, allegedly ignoring the manifest weight of the evidence.08 
In its discussion of this case, the Supreme Court stated: 
Nor is it true that at common law habeas corpus was avail-
able only to inquire into the jurisdiction, in a narrow sense, of 
the committing court. Bushell's Case is again in point. Chief 
Justice Vaughan did not base his decision on the theory that 
the Court of Oyer and Terminer had no jurisdiction to com-
mit persons for contempt, but on the plain denial of due 
process, violative of Magna Charta, of a court's imprisoning 
the jury because it disagreed with the verdict. 64 
The Court then quoted extensively from Busheil's Case0G and Bacon's 
Abridgment,66 and concluded that at the time when the Constitution 
was adopted and the Judiciary Act67 first conferred habeas corpus 
jurisdiction upon federal courts, "there was respectable common-
61. Vaughan 135, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670). 
62. Sec 372 U.S. at 403. 
63. For an engaging account of the background of this famous case, sec Deutsch, 
Hugh Latimer's Candle and the Trial of William Penn, 51 A.B.A.J. 624 (1965). 
64. 372 U.S. at 404. 
65. "[W)hcn a man is brought by Habeas Corpus to the Court, and upon retorn 
of it, it appears to the Court, That he was against Law imprison'd and detain'd, 
.•• he shall never be by the Act of the Court remanded to his unlawful imprison-
ment, for then the Court should do an act of Injustice in imprisoning him, de novo, 
against Law, whereas the great Charter is Quod nullus libet homo imprisonetur 
nisi per lcgem terrac •••• This is the present case, and this was the case upon all 
the Presidents [precedents] produc'd and many more that might be produc'd, where 
upon Habeas Corpus, many have been discharg'd •••• 
"This appears plainly by many old Books, if the Reason of them be rightly taken, 
For insufficient causes are as no causes retorn'd; and to send a man back to Prison 
for no cause rctom'd, seems unworthy of a Court." Id. at 404-05. 
66. "[I]f the commitment be against law, as being made by one who had no 
jurisdiction of the cause, or for a matter for which by law no man ought to be 
punished, the court are to discharge him • • • ; and the commitment is liable to the 
same objection where the cause is so loosely set forth, that the court cannot adjudge 
whether it were a reasonable ground of imprisonment or not." Id. at 405, (Emphasis 
added by the Supreme Court.) 
67. I Stat._ 73, 81-82 (1789). 
January 1966] Legal l[istory in the High Court 463 
law authority for the proposition that habeas was available to 
remedy any kind of governmental restraint contrary to funda-
mental law."68 
There are several interesting aspects to this conclusion. First, 
it is striking that the single case the Court offered to demonstrate 
the use of habeas corpus to release a person convicted of a crime in 
violation of "fundamental law" or "due process" was a case where 
the prisoner had been committed for contempt. This signifies more 
than the probable absence of directly applicable authority. A con-
tempt case is not even properly analogous on this point for, as 
clearly indicated in the Bushell opinion itself, English courts could 
exercise a far broader scope of review when examining a commit-
ment for contempt than when considering commitments for treason 
or felony.69 
Second, it is questionable whether the portion of the Bushell 
report quoted by the Supreme Court is even a part of Chief Justice 
Vaughan's opinion. The quoted passages are from the second of 
two collections of briefs of cases appearing at the end of the report 
and are preceded by the title: "Presidents [precedents]. That the 
Court of Common Pleas, upon Habeas Corpus, hath Discharg' d 
Persons Imprison'd by other Courts, upon the Insufficiency of the 
Retom only, and not for Privilege."70 
Third, as indicated in the above title and in portions of the 
original passage edited out in the version quoted by the Supreme 
Court, the true subject of the quoted passage is whether Common 
Pleas could issue its writ of habeas corpus for a person imprisoned 
by another court when there was no issue of privilege. The absence 
of some issue of privilege is significant because Bushell's Case arose 
at a time when the Common Pleas judges and other authorities 
were actively debating whether that court could issue the writ of 
habeas corpus in a circumstance other than the jurisdiction expressly 
granted in the Star Chamber Act, or the familiar situation where 
habeas corpus was an ancillary remedy to enforce some litigant's 
"privilege" to have his case heard exclusively in Common Pleas.71 
68. 372 U.S. at 404-06. Cf. Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 376 (1879), wherein the 
Court stated that the Bushell court "discharged the prisoners, on the ground that 
their conviction was void, inasmuch as jurymen cannot be indicted for rendering 
any verdict they choose." 
69. See text accompanying note 82 infra. 
70. Vaughan at 154, 124 Eng. Rep. at 1015. 
71. See Jones's Case, 2 Mod. 198, 86 Eng. Rep. 102~ (C.P. 1676); 1 HOLDSWORTH, A 
HISTORY OF ENGUSH LAw 202-03 (1931). The controversy was ended by the Hapeas 
Corpus Act, 31 Car. 2, c. 2 (1679), which dearly gave Common Pleas independent 
jurisdiction to issue habeas corpus in a criminal case. 
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In this context, it appears highly unlikely that the author of the 
quoted passage assumed the heavy and unnecessary burden of 
demonstrating that the writ of habeas corpus could be used to 
"remedy any kind of governmental restraint contrary to fundamental 
law." All the author had to do-and all the title and language of 
the passage indicate that he purported to do-was to answer the 
disputed question whether Common Pleas could issue a writ of 
habeas corpus ad subjiciendum in a case not involving privilege 
where the respondent's return to the writ did not set out sufficient 
cause for the petitioner's detention. 
Fourth, the language quoted from the Bushell report to the 
effect that the writ of habeas corpus was used to discharge persons 
"against Law imprison'd and detain'd, ... whereas the Great 
Charter is Quod nullus libet homo imprisonetur nisi per legem 
terrae"72 was not understood by sixteenth and seventeenth century 
authorities to grant a general license to remedy restraints intoler-
able under some vague standard of justice or natural or "funda-
mental" law. A passage from Sir Edward Coke's Institutes discussing 
Magna Charta in relation to personal liberty as enforced by the 
writ of habeas corpus provides insight into the contemporary 
significance of such phrases as "due process of law" and "against 
Law imprison'd and detain'd."73 Coke's stated requirements all 
concern the formal regularity of the process of commitment and 
the authority of the official who signed it. There is nothing in his 
72. See note 65 supra. 
73. 1 CoKE, 2D INsrITUTES 52-52t (1797 ed.): "Now seeing that no man can be taken, 
arrested, attached, or imprisoned but by due processe of law, and according to the 
law of the land, these conclusions hereupon doe follow. 
"First, that a commitment by lawfull warrant, either in deed or in law, is accounted 
in law due processe or proceeding of law, and by the law of the land, as well as by 
processe by force of the kings writ. 
"2. That he or they, which doe commit them, have lawful! authority. 
"3. That his warrant, or mittimus be lawful!, and that must be in writing under 
his hand and seale. 
"4. The cause must be contained in the warrant, as for treason, felony, &:c. or for 
suspition of treason or felony, &c. • • • • 
"5. The warrant or mittimus containing a lawfull cause, ought to have a lawful! 
conclusion, viz. and him safely to keep, until! he be delivered by law, &:c. and not 
until! the party comitting doth further order. And this doth evidently appeare by 
the writs of habeas corpus, both in the kings bench, and common pleas, eschequer and 
chancery •••. 
"By these writs it manifestly appeareth, that no man ought to be imprisoned, 
but for some certain cause: and these words, ad subjiciend. et recipiend. <be. prove that 
cause must be shewed: for otherwise how can the court take order therein according 
to law?" 
Coke's preeminence as the most authoritative seventeenth century commentator on 
the meaning of Magna Carta is discussed in Kurland, Magna Carta and Constitutional• 
ism in the United States, in THE GREAT CHARTER 48, 50-51 (1965). 
. 
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discussion regarding whether the content of substantive offenses 
or even procedures employed ·at the trial squared with "funda-
mental law" or gave rise to an "intolerable restraint."74 Similarly, 
Holdsworth suggests that although there was "no historical con-
nection between Magna Charta and this writ," nevertheless when 
habeas corpus came to be used as an independent remedy in the case 
of persons committed to prison by the Privy Council, "men natu-
rally connected it with those clauses of Magna Charta which pro-
hibited imprisonment without due process of law."75 Holdsworth 
also stated: 
Due process of law was interpreted by the House of Commons 
to mean due process of common law; and Magna Charta and 
these later statutes were supposed to prove that arrests by order 
of the king or Council were illegal. But we have seen that this 
interpretation was never acquiesced in by the crown; and that 
the mediaeval protests and mediaeval legislation never suc-
ceeded in limiting the large and vague power of the king or 
his council to make arrests.76 
The king was obviously desirous of restricting the scope of the 
·writ. In contrast, the parliamentary opposition, which was supported 
by the common lawyers, wished to utilize the writ as a protective 
device to preclude imprisonment without · common-law process. 
Finally, in the seventeenth century the uncertain status of the 
executive detention power was resolved in favor of the demands of 
Parliament, which effected its object by enacting legislation. "[I]t 
· is this legislation, which extends from the Petition of Right to 1816, 
that has given to the ·writ its great place in our modern constitu-
tional law."77 
If a seventeenth century lawyer ever urged that the function or 
office of habeas corpus was the "vindication of due process,"78 he 
would undoubtedly have had in mind the use of habeas corpus to 
74. The full passage from Coke also seems to explain the meaning of another 
passage on which the Supreme Court relied, 372 U.S. at 405 n.14-Hale's terse and 
ambiguous phrases "cause for which a man ought not to be imprisond" and imprison• 
ment "without lawful or just cause." See 1 CoKE, op. cit. supra note 73, at 52-52t. 
Similarly, INGERSOLL, op. cit. supra note 20, at 44, states that "the only inquiry upon 
the return under magna charta, from which the writ derived its efficacy, was, whether 
the commitment was per legem terrae, that is, by an officer authorized by the law of 
the land, for an offence against the law, and for a purpose, and in a form recognized by 
the law." See also Dunham, Magna Carta and British Constitutionalism, in THE GREAT 
CHARTER 20, 28, 34-36 (1965). 
75. 9 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 71, at 111, 112 (1926). 
76. Id. at 112. 
77. Id. at 114. 
78. This theory was urged by the Supreme Court in Fay. See 3?2 U.S. at 402. 
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review executive detentions and to release persons ·wrongfully im-
prisoned by the crown. The idea that this phrase from Magna 
Charta implies some supervisory review of the acts of judges of 
superior courts, or a broad license to "remedy any kind of govern-
mental restraint contrary to fundamental law"79 originates in the 
United States Reports, not the annals of English history. 
Fifth, Chief Justice Vaughan's stated reason for issuing the writ 
of habeas corpus in Bushell' s Case was merely the insufficiency of 
the respondent's return to the writ. The Bushell court gave three 
grounds of insufficiency. First, the return did not set out the partic-
ulars of the alleged contempt-the evidence against whose manifest 
weight the jurors were charged with acting. so This observation of 
course suggests a very broad scope of review for courts issuing writs 
of habeas corpus. When this aspect of Bushell' s Case is compared with 
the felony prosecution in Fay v. Noia, however, it is significant that 
Chief Justice Vaughan emphasized that this broad reviewing power 
applied only to persons committed for contempt. Indeed, if a 
respondent's return to a ·writ of habeas corpus stated nothing more 
than the fact that the petitioner had been committed for treason 
or felony, "this is a sufficient retorn to remand him, though in 
truth this is a general retorn."81 Chief Justice Vaughan explained 
the distinction between cases involving felony and those involving 
contempt: 
The cases are not alike; for upon a general commitment for 
treason or felony, the prisoner (the cause appearing) may press 
for his tryal, ... and upon his indictment and tryal, the partic-
ular cause of his imprisonment must appear, which proving 
no treason or felony, the prisoner shall have the benefit of it. 
But in this case [involving contempt], though the evidence given 
were no full nor manifest evidence against the persons indicted, 
but such as the jury upon it ought to have acquitted those 
indicted, the prisoner shall never have any benefit of it, but 
79. Id. at 405. 
80. "But here the evidence given to the jury is not exposed at all to this Court, but 
the judgment of the Court of Sessions upon that evidence is only expos'd to us; who 
tell us it was full and manifest. But our judgment ought to be grounded upon our own 
inferences and undezstandings, and not upon theirs." Vaughan at 137, 124 Eng, 
Rep. at 1007. 
"Hence it is apparent, that the commitment and retorn pursuing it, being in it self 
too general and uncertain, we ought not implicitly to think the commitment was re 
vera, for cause particular and sufficient enough, because it was the act of the Court of 
Sessions." Vaughan at 140, 124 Eng. Rep. at 1008. 
81. Vaughan at 142, 124 Eng. Rep. at 1009. See also text following note 16 supra. 
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must continue in prison, when remanded, until he hath paid 
that fine unjustly impos'd on him, which was the whole end 
of his imprisonment.82 
The return in Bushell's Case was also held to be faulty for not 
stating that the jurors gave their verdict corruptly, knowing that the 
evidence against the persons indicted was full and manifest. Since 
reasonable men can differ on their evaluation of the same testimony, 
the court held that conclusions contrary to those reached by the 
court were not contemptuous absent some element of corruption.83 
Finally, the return was insufficient because the common law did 
not permit courts to fine a jury for going against judicial direc-
tions or the evidence in a particular case. The nature of the functions 
of judge and jury made it impossible for a judge to give an enforce-
able direction in this matter or to determine whether such a direc-
tion had been disregarded. 84 
Thus, one searches the Bushell opinion in vain for support of 
the proposition for which Mr. Justice Brennan used this famous 
case. The ground for issuance of the Vvrit was not some abstract 
violation of "fundamental law" or "whatever society deems to be 
an intolerable restraint," but simply the fact that the return failed 
to set out a sufficient basis for the· commitment. "For," as the very 
passage relied on by the Court observes, "insufficient causes are as 
no causes retorn'd; and to send a man back to Prison for no cause 
retorn'd, seems unworthy of a Court."85 
82. Vaughan at 143, 124 Eng. Rep. at 1010. 
83. "I conclude therefore, that this retom, charging the prisoners to have acquitted • 
Penn and Mead, against full and manifest evidence first and next, without saying that 
they did know and believe that evidence to be· full and manifest against the indicted 
persons, is no cause of fine or imprisonment." Vaughan at 142, 124 Eng. Rep. at 1009. 
84. "Without a fact agreed, it is as impossible for a Judge, or any other, to know 
the law relating to that fact, or direct concerning it, as to know an accident that hath 
no subject. 
"Hence it follows, that the Judge can never direct what the law is in any matter 
controverted, without first knowing the fact; and then it follows, that without his 
previous knowledge of the fact, the jury cannot go against his direction in law, for he 
could not direct. 
"But the Judge, qua Judge, cannot know the fact possible, but from the evidence 
which the jury have, but (as will appear) he can never know what evidence the jury will 
have, and consequently he cannot know the matter of fact, nor punish the jury for 
going against their evidence, when he cannot know what their evidence is. • • • 
"Being retum'd of the vicinage, wence the cause of action ariseth, the law supposeth 
them thence to have sufficient knowledge to try the matter in issue (and so they must) 
though no evidence were given on either side in Court, but to this evidence the Judge 
is a stranger." Vaughan at 147, 124 Eng. Rep. at 1012. 
85. Vaughan at 156, 124 Eng. Rep. at 1016. Quoted by the Supreme Court in Fay 
v. Noia, 372 U.S. at 404-05. 
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C. Misapplication of Bushell's Case 
The seventeenth and eighteenth century law of habeas corpus 
posed three insurmountable obstacles to any attempt to use the ·writ 
of habeas corpus for the "vindication of due process,"B6 if that phrase 
denotes the sort of "fundamental law" or "intolerable restraint" con-
siderations invoked to free the petitioner in Fay v. Noia. First, as 
previously discussed, a general return that the petitioner had been 
committed for treason or felony was a sufficient return to a writ of 
hab~as corpus. Second, petitioners were forbidden to challenge the 
truth of particulars set out in the respondent's return to the writ. 
Third, once a person had been convicted by a superior court of 
general jurisdiction, a court disposing of a habeas corpus petition 
could not go behind the conviction for any purpose other than to 
verify the formal jurisdiction of the committing court.B1 In view of 
these three limitations, it may be said that practically every kind 
of "intolerable restraint" or violation of "fundamental law" that 
the twentieth century lawyer might imagine-except an imprison-
ment without stated legal justification, such as the imprisonment 
involved in Bushell-could· be shielded from inquiry by a general 
return, a valid judgment, or the rule against controverting facts 
set out in the return, and a court would be virtually powerless to 
supply a remedy by habeas corpus.BB Concededly, there should be a 
remedy for every violation of law involving a person's liberty, and 
perhaps in our day the remedy should be through the writ of 
habeas corpus. But it is misleading to claim support for this proposi-
tion in the holding or language of Bushell's Case. 
III. HABEAS CORPUS To OMIT TRADITIONAL REQUIREMENT OF . 
IMMEDIATE AND CONFINING RESTRAINT 
Where the history of habeas corpus is concerned, the Supreme 
Court has also had its sins of omission. In Jones v. Cunningham,80 
the question was whether a state prisoner who had been released on 
86. 372 U.S. at 402. 
87. See notes 29 and 55 supra. American cases on this subject are discussed in Oaks, 
Habeas Corpus in the States-1776-1865, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 243, 261-64 (1965). 
88. See generally Rubinstein, supra note 31, at 325-26. "Superior courts do not have 
to enumerate or specify the grounds upon which the imprisonment is founded; nor 
does this have to be done in the return to the writ. Consequently, the opportunities 
to find fault with the 'cause shown' are almost nil .... Superior and other common 
law courts enjoy, therefore, an almost complete immunity froni review on habeas 
corpus." The scope of review was of course Wider where the pris6ncr had been com• 
mitted by an inferior court. Ibid. 
89. 371 U.S. 236 (1963). 
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parole was "in custody in violation of the Constitution,"90 so that 
he could attack the validity of his conviction by a federal writ of 
habeas corpus directed to the parole board. 
If there was any single feature that characterized the writ of 
habeas corpus in both its early statutory and common-law forms, it 
was the requirement that adult petitioners be subject to an im-
mediate and confining restraint on their liberty.91 Early state court 
decisions in this country were in agreement that the Habeas Corpus 
Act "evidently alluded to persons who were within the four walls 
of a prison" and that it "did not relate to persons who were not 
actually in custody or imprisoned, or who were out on bail."92 The 
Supreme Court relied on these state court opinions in its 1920 
decision that a prisoner who had been released on bail, "being no 
longer under actual restraint, . . . was not entitled, to the writ of 
habeas corpus."93 Lower federal courts appear to have followed this 
rule almost unanimously in bail cases up to the present day.94 
Similarly, once the practice of releasing prisoners on parole became 
current toward the end of the nineteenth century, the courts appear 
to have been almost unanimous in holding that a writ of habeas 
corpus could not be maintained to test the validity of a conviction 
after a petitioner had been so released.95 
90. 28 U.S.C. § 224l(c)(3) (1964). 
91. See, e.g., Palmer v. Forsyth, 4 B. & C. 401, 402, 107 Eng. Rep. 1108, 1109 (K.B. 
1825) where a writ of habeas corpus was quashed because the custodian "had no power 
at all over the body of the defendants." See 4 BACON, op. cit. supra note 20, at 471. In 
situations where the writ sought was the cum causa, which was used to obtain review 
of a case before a higher court, the courts seem to have been less exacting in the 
custody requirement. See Mitchell v. Mitchinham, 2 Dow!. & R. 722 (K.B. 1823). 
92. State v. Buyck, 2 Bay 563, 564 (S.C. 1804). See Dodge's Case, 6 Mart. 569 (La. 
1819); Respublica v. Arnold, 3 Yeates 263 (Pa. 1801); Logan v. State, 3 Brev. 415 (S. C. 
1814). Cf. State ex rel. Ellerbe, in re Daniel, 39 Ala. 546 (1865); Ex parte Lee, 39 Ala. 
457 (1864) (no habeas corpus review of regularity of duty assignments of military per-
sonnel); Cox v. Gee, 60 N.C. 516 (1864). But cf. Ex parte Badgley, 7 Cow. 472 (N.Y. 
1827), where it was held that a petitioner can be "discharged" by habeas corpus from 
one cause of imprisonment even though the respondent can validly detain him for 
another. 
93. Stallings v. Splain, 253 U.S. 339, 343 (1920). 
94. See Allen v. United States, 349 F.2d 362 (1st Cir. 1965) (motion for relief under 
28 U.S.C. § 2255); Matysek v. United States, 339 F.2d 389 (9th Cir. 1964) (same); cases 
cited in 17 RUTGERS L. R.Ev. 808 (1963) and 15 N.Y.U. INTRA. L. R.Ev. 153 (1960). Contra, 
United States ex rel. Shott·v. Tehan, 337 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1964), cert. granted sub 
nom. Tehan v. Shott, 381 U.S. 923 (1965). Bailey, Federal Habeas Corpus, 45 B.U.L. 
R.Ev. 161, 186 n.105 (1965), states that the petitioner in Tehan was free on bail, although 
the opinion makes no mention of this fact. 
In Allen v. United States, supra, the court distinguished Jones v. Cunningham on 
the ground that the parolee involved there was subject to far more restrictions on his 
freedom than a· person who is at large on bail. 
95. See Shelton v. United States, 242 F.2d 101 (5th Cir. 1957) (motion for relief 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255); cases cited in Jones v. Cunningham, 294 F.2d 608 (4th Cir. 
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The classic illustration of the principle involved in the bail and 
parole cases is the Supreme Court's own 1885 decision in Wales v. 
Whitney.96 That case involved a habeas corpus petition by a naval 
officer who sought relief from the following order by the Secretary 
of the Navy: "You are hereby placed under arrest, and you will 
confine yourself to the limits of the City of Washington."97 In 
holding that this restraint was not the type of "restraint or imprison-
ment suffered by a party applying for a writ of habeas corpus, which 
is necessary to sustain the 1vrit,"98 the Court relied on some early 
bail cases and stated: 
Something more than moral restraint is necessary to make a 
case for habeas corpus. There must be actual confinement or 
the present means of enforcing it. . .. 
It is said in argument that such is the power exercised over 
the appellant under the order of the Secretary of the Navy. 
But this is, we think, a mistake. If Dr. Wales had chosen to 
disobey this order, he had nothing to do but take the next or 
any subsequent train from the city and leave it. There was no 
one at hand to hinder him. . . . The fear of ... [being arrested 
and returned to the District], which may or may not keep Dr. 
Wales within the limits of the city, is a moral restraint which 
concerns his own convenience, and in regard to which he exer-
cises his own will.Do 
Relying on the foregoing authorities, the Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit held that the 1vrit of habeas corpus was not 
available to the parolee in Jones v. Cunningham.100 The Supreme 
Court reversed. Although Mr. Justice Black "looked to common-
law usages and the history of habeas corpus both in England and 
in this country,"101 he chose his precedents from among recent deci-
sion involving aliens seeking entrance to this country, and common-
law decisions under which the 1vrit was issued to liberate wives or 
minor children "not under imprisonment, restraint or duress of any 
kind."102 The Court held that the principles allowing habeas corpus 
release in these cases were applicable to the "significant restraints" 
1961), retld, 371 U.S. 236 (1963). Contra, Ex parte Snodgrass, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep, 359, 
65 S.W. 1061 (1901); cases cited note 106 infra (decided after Jones v. Cunningham), 
96. 114 U.S. 564 (1885). 
97. Id. at 566. 
98. Id. at 571. 
99. Id. at 571-72. 
100. Jones v. Cunningham, 294 F.2d 608 (4th Cir. 1961), rev'd, 871 U.S. 236 (1963), 
The petitioner was seeking :relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 
101. 371 U.S. at 238. 
102. Id. at 239. The history of habeas corpus as a remedy in child custody disputes 
is discussed in Oaks, supra note 87, at 270-74. 
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imposed on the petitioner by his parole board.103 Then, without so 
much as mentioning the bail and parole cases, or even its own deci-
sion in Wales v. Whitney,104 which involved a remarkably similar 
restraint, the Court concluded: "While petitioner's parole releases 
him from immediate physical imprisonment, it imposes conditions 
which significantly confine and restrain his freedom; this is enough 
to ~eep him in the 'custody' of the members of the Virginia Parole 
Board within the meaning of the habeas corpus statute."105 
As in the cases of Townsend and Fay, the result reached in Jones 
v. Cunningham may be a sound decision for our time and circum- · 
stances.106 Recent state-court decisions show a trend toward modifying 
the traditional custody requirement.101 But whatever the wisdom of 
such modification, the Supreme Court's statement that its decision 
in Jones v. Cunningham was supported by the "history of habeas 
corpus both in England and in this country" falls considerably short 
of complete accuracy.1os 
It may be that we know too much of legal history already. In 
103. Petitioner had been directed to live with his aunt and uncle in a certain com-
munity. He could not change his residence, leave the community, or own or operate 
a motor vehicle, without the permission of a parole officer to whom he was required 
to report regularly. 371 U.S. at 242. 
104. Cf. Kurland, Foreword to The Supreme Court-1963 Term, 78 HARv. L. REv. 
143, 170 (1964). Inexplicably, even the state's brief in this case failed to cite Wales v. 
Whitney. Brief for Respondent, Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963). The 
Petitioner's brief distinguished Wales on the basis of what was at best an alternative 
ground of decision: being subject to military orders, petitioner could have been con-
fined to Washington by a lawful directive pertaining to his military duties, so that the 
order in question placed no added restraint on his liberty. Brief for Petitioner, 28-29, 
Jones v. Cunningham, supra. Despite the presence of this alternative ground, a con-
sideration of the Wales opinion as a whole shows that the Court's holding was not 
limited to petitioners in the military. 
105. 371 U.S. at 243. 
106. E.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Stevens v. Myers, 213 A.2d 613 (Pa. 1965), a well 
reasoned and erudite opinion expressly modifying the law to permit a prisoner to use 
the writ of habeas corpus to attack the validity of a final judgment of conviction even 
though he has not yet begun to serve the sentence imposed. Accord, Martin v. Common-
wealth, 349 F.2d 781 (4th Cir. 1965). Recent decisions permitting a person to use 
habeas corpus to test the validity of a sentence from which he has been· paroled 
include People ex rel. Zangrillo v. Doherty, 40 Misc. 2d 505, 243 N.Y.S.2d 694 (Sup. 
Ct. 1963); Garnick v. Miller, 403 P .2d 850 (Nev. 1965); Commonwealth ex rel. Alexander 
v. Rundle, 213 A.2d 644 (Pa. 1965). For a discussion of some modem reasons for 
modifying the traditional requirement of custody as a prerequisite for habeas corpus, 
particularly in cases like Jones v. Cunningham where the petitioner was in custody 
when he initiated his petition for the writ, see 59 MICH. L. REv. 312 (1960). 
107. 371 U.S. at 238. 
108. In discussing Jones v. Cunningham, a note in 51 CALIF. L. REv. 228, 230 
(1963), suggests that "it was somewhat misleading to resort to historical usages .to 
define the meaning of 'custody' for purposes of postconviction review" because, 
"historically, the Great Writ was primarily a pretrial device to prevent the arbitrary 
imprisonment of an individual without bringing him to trial." 
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certain comers of the law, "ignorance is the best of law reformers."10o 
If we are to use history in legal opinions, however-and it is difficult 
to make any use of precedent without involving history to some 
extent-we must avoid getting facts twisted by wishful thinking 
or "innocently motivated after-mindedness."110 As one perceptive 
scholar has observed, "the historian, unlike the brief-1vriter, can 
never proceed on the assumption that history unfolds backward in 
neat legal categories; his task, whatever his opinions on the merits 
of contemporary policies, is to analyze the past on its own terms."111 
This ideal was not realized in the "historical" discussions in the 
three important habeas corpus decisions of the 1962 Term, which 
established a new scope of factual inquiry ("de nova"), a vague new 
extension of the legal grounds for issuance of the '\\Trit ("detentions 
in violation of fundamental law"); and a new and practically all-
encompassing definition of the custody that will suffice to qualify 
for issuance of the writ ("conditions which significantly confine and 
restrain freedom"). 
Few students of the law object to a court's reshaping old re-
medies to fit new and growing social problems, so long as the court 
moves within the interstitial area governed by what Karl Llewellyn 
called the "law of leeways."112 But the legal rules fashioned to cover 
such growth should be cloaked in reason, not garbed in a regal 
patchwork of history that, on close examination, proves as em-
barrassingly illusory as the Emperor's new clothes. 
109. HOLMES, Tm: COMMON LAw 78 (1881), quoted in WEINER, UsES AND ABUSES OF 
LEGAL HISfORY: A PRACTITIONER'S VIEW 4 (1962). 
110. See WEINER, op. cit. supra note 109, at 9. 
Ill. Roche, The Expatriation Cases: "Breathes There the Man With Soul So Dead," 
1963 SuP. Cr. R.Ev. 325, 326. In Kelly, CUO and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1964 
SUP. Cr. REv. 119, 155, the author discusses numerous important areas of recent 
Supreme Court adjudication to support his thesis that the Court "has confused the 
writing of briefs with the writing of history." 
112. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 219-20 (1951); LLEWELLYN, BRAMBLE 
BUSH 156-57 (1951 ). 
